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Close Only Counts in Horseshoes, Hand Grenades, and...
Patents?: The Supreme Court Upholds the Each-Element Test
of the Doctrine of Equivalents and "Clarifies" the Role of
Prosecution History Estoppel in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chemical Co.
"The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."' Pursuant to this constitutional authority, Congress
created a patent system that grants an inventor "the right to exclude
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention"
for a period of twenty years. 2 In exchange for this twenty-year
exclusivity, the inventor is required to disclose the contents of his
invention such that a "person skilled in the art" could "make and
use" the invention by merely using the information in the patent.3 In
the application for the patent, the inventor must include "one or
more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention."4 If
allowed, the patent is issued and the inventor becomes known as the
patentee.5
Infringement of a patent occurs when a person makes, uses, sells,
offers for sale, or imports a patented invention without the patentee's
authorization.6
Infringement may be found either by literal
infringement of the patentee's claims or by infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents.7 Literal infringement occurs only when each
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(1) (West Supp. 1998). If the invention is a process, the
statute further grants the patentee "the right to exclude others from using, offering for
sale or selling... products made by that process." Id. In either case, the 20-year period
begins to run from the date the patent application is filed with the Patent and Trademark
Office. See id. § 154(a)(2). For the text of the entire Patent Act, see 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 1376.
3. 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (1994).
4. Id. § 112 para. 2.
5. See id. § 100(d).
6. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West Supp. 1998). Whoever either induces or
contributes to the infringement of a patent is also considered to be an infringer. See id.
§ 271(b)-(c).
7. See Rudolph P. Hofmann, Jr., The Doctrine of Equivalents: Twelve Years of
Federal Circuit Precedent Still Leaves Practitioners Wondering, 20 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1033, 1038-39 (1994).
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of the elements covered by the claims of the plaintiff's patent is

exactly duplicated by the accused infringer's activity.8 If literal
infringement does not exist, infringement may still be found under
the doctrine of equivalents.' In general, infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents occurs when the accused device contains
changes to the patented device that are enough to avoid literal
infringement but, in essence, are substitutions that add nothing new
to the patent.10
In any infringement action involving the doctrine of equivalents,
there is a choice between two conflicting policies." On one side there
is the historic policy of giving the public fair notice of what the
patentee views as the scope of the patent in order to allow
competitors to avoid actions that would infringe the patent and to
permit legitimate designing around the patent."2 On the other side
there is the policy of giving the patentee complete and fair protection
of his invention. 3 Both policies further the statutory purpose of
encouraging progress and innovation in technology."
An unbridled application of the doctrine of equivalents could
swing the balance between these competing policies in favor of the
patentee by unfairly robbing the public of notice as to the true
bounds of the patent. To mitigate this potential injustice, prosecution
history estoppel evolved as a limitation on the doctrine of
equivalents.' Prosecution history estoppel precludes a patentee from
expanding the elements of his claims to cover aspects of the invention
that were surrendered by amendment during the patent prosecution

8. See, e.g., Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574,1577,1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
9. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040, 1045
(1997) (unanimous decision). See generally 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS
§§ 18.02[1], 18.04 (1998) (discussing the origin and application of the doctrine of
equivalents).
10. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
The proper application of, and the tests used for determining equivalency under, the
doctrine of equivalents are discussed infra in notes 80-83, 90-94 and accompanying text.
The origin and history of the doctrine is discussed infra in notes 113-75 and accompanying
text.
11. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 945 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(en bane) (Bennett, J., dissenting); Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine
of Equivalents in Patent Law: Questions That Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L.
REv. 673, 682 (1989); Bruce M. Wexler, Patent Law: Bridling the Doctrine of
Equivalents-Preclusionby PriorArt, 1991 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 571, 576-77.
12. See Pennwalt,833 F.2d at 945 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
13. See id. (Bennett, J., dissenting).
14. See id. (Bennett, J., dissenting).
15. See Hofmann, supra note 7, at 1055.
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process.
The varying judicial applications of prosecution history estoppel
and the doctrine of equivalents have led to uncertainty in patent
practice.1 7 Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 8 a
much-anticipated decision by the Federal Circuit, was expected to
solidify the standard for infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. 19 Instead, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, produced
a majority opinion, a concurring opinion, and three dissenting
opinions-a testament to how controversial the doctrine of
equivalents had become. 20
In response to the significant disagreement in the Federal Circuit
concerning the doctrine of equivalents, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari2' to "clarify the proper scope of the doctrine."' On March
3, 1997, the Court handed down its decision in Warner-Jenkinson Co.
v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,' the second of two recent patent
cases24 that, taken together, are expected to shape and guide the
16. See id. at 1055-56; Adelman & Francione, supra note 11, at 680. The process of
obtaining a patent is known as the patent prosecution process. See Kevin R. Casey, Note,
Judge Learned Hand Guides the Federal Circuit: A Model for a Uniform Doctrine of
Prosecution History Estoppel, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 363, 366. The patent prosecution
process consists of "an application, amendments, office actions, and other
communication[s] between the Patent and Trademark Office and the patent applicant or
the applicant's representative." Id.
17. See Adelman & Francione, supra note 11, at 682-83.
18. 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane) (per curiam), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997)
(unanimous decision).
19. See Brooke Quist, Note, The Supreme Court Provides Clarity to the Illusive
Doctrine of Equivalents-Hilton Davis Reversed, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 363, 369
(1997). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was established by the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 125, 96 Stat. 25, 36-37 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994)). The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over
all appeals in patent cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994). The Federal Circuit acquired
jurisdiction over decisions on patent applications and interferences when it replaced the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and assumed the appellate jurisdiction of the Court
of Claims to review monetary damage claims stemming from alleged unauthorized
governmental use of patented inventions. See id. Since the establishment of the Federal
Circuit, the Supreme Court rarely hears appeals of patent decisions; therefore, the
Federal Circuit has primary responsibility for the development of patent law. See
Adelman & Francione, supra note 11, at 676 n.11.
20. See Quist, supra note 19, at 369.
21. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 516 U.S. 1145 (1996).
22. Warner-Jenkinson, 117 S.Ct. at 1045. The question presented was "[w]hether
patent infringement exists whenever the accused product or process is 'equivalent' to the
invention claimed in the patent, in that the differences are not 'substantial' as determined
by a jury, even though the accused product or process is outside the literal scope of the
patent claim." Brief for Petitioner at i, Warner-Jenkinson (No. 95-728).
23. 117 S.Ct. 1040 (1997).
24. The other recent patent decision by the Supreme Court is Markman v. Westview
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practice of patent law into the twenty-first century.25
This Note first presents the factual background leading to Hilton
Davis Chemical Company's ("Hilton Davis") suit against WarnerJenkinson Company ("Warner-Jenkinson") for patent infringement.2 6
It then briefly discusses the district court and Federal Circuit
decisions2 7 before detailing the Supreme Court's decision on the
proper application of the doctrine of equivalents and prosecution
history estoppel.28 Following the discussion of the Court's opinion,
the Note examines the relevant background law on the doctrine of
equivalents.29 It then analyzes the Court's decision on the proper
application of the doctrine of equivalents in light of the background
law.30 Next it examines the relevant background law on prosecution
history estoppel. 31 Finally, the Note analyzes the Court's decision on
the proper application of prosecution history estoppel and concludes
Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996), in which the Court held that "the construction of
a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the
court." Id. at 1387. Because claim construction is now considered a question of law,
issues related to claim construction may be decided in summary proceedings even in the
face of conflicting evidence. See James R. Farrand & Ronald L. Johnston, Expanded
Doctrineof Equivalents Extends Patents Old and New, COMPUTER LAW., June 1997, at 1,
2. Since claim construction is often the critical part of a patent case, Markman is
particularly important because it will allow a significant number of patent cases to be
decided in summary fashion. See id.
Although Markman had not been decided at the time Warner-Jenkinson submitted
its brief to the Supreme Court, Warner-Jenkinson argued that if the Court were to hold
that judges are to decide questions regarding claim construction, then judges should also
decide whether an accused device infringes under the doctrine of equivalents. See
Warner-Jenkinson,117 S. Ct. at 1053. This argument was in contravention of the Federal
Circuit's holding in Hilton Davis that infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is a
question for the trier of fact. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62
F.3d 1512, 1520-21 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (per curiam), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997)
(unanimous decision). The Supreme Court chose not to decide whether infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents is a question for the judge or the jury, but did state that
the Federal Circuit's decision was "amply supported" by the Court's precedent. See
Warner-Jenkinson,117 S. Ct. at 1053. The Court went on to note that any concerns about
the unreviewability of "black-box jury verdicts" could be addressed by either a court's
power to grant summary judgment based on prosecution history estoppel or the doctrine
of equivalents, or by the use of "a special verdict and/or interrogatories on each claim
element." Id. at 1053 n.8.
25. See Farrand & Johnston, supra note 24, at 1, 2; Janice M. Mueller, Crafting
Patentsfor the Twenty-First Century: Maximize Patent Strength and Avoid Prosecution
HistoryEstoppel in a Post-MarkmanlHilton Davis World, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC'Y 499, 500 (1997).
26. See infra notes 33-60 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 71-97 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 98-175 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 176-200 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 201-230 and accompanying text.

1940

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

with a general discussion of the potential impact of Warner-Jenkinson
on the practice of patent law.32
Warner-Jenkinson and Hilton Davis manufacture dyes.33 The
process of making two of these dyes, FD & C34 Red Dye #40 and
Yellow Dye #6, produces impurities in the dyes 35 which must be
removed in order to meet the specifications of the Food & Drug
Administration.36 In order to purify these dyes, Hilton Davis and
Warner-Jenkinson historically had used an inefficient and costly
process known as "salting out."37 In 1982, Warner-Jenkinson
contracted with Osmonics, Inc. ("Osmonics") to process two of
Warner-Jenkinson's dye preparations, including FD & C Red Dye
#40, using Osmonics's standard ultrafiltration process with various
membranes Osmonics selected as appropriate for the size of the
molecules to be filtered. 3 Although the initial tests showed some
positive signs, 39 the tests were unsuccessful in that they failed to
produce a sufficiently pure dye.4" As a result, Warner-Jenkinson
suspended work on Red Dye #40, but continued to work on other
dyes that had no bearing on the eventual patent infringement case.41
Over the next several years, Warner-Jenkinson improved the
chemistry of Red Dye #40 for filtration purposes enough to go
forward with commercial use of the ultrafiltration process for Red
Dye #40.42 In 1986, ultrafiltration equipment was installed and
Warner-Jenkinson began commercial production of Red Dye #40
using
ultrafiltration. 43
Warner-Jenkinson's
later-accused
ultrafiltration process operates at pressures from 200 p.s.i.g. to nearly
4
500 p.s.i.g. 4 and at a pH of 5.0. 1
32- See infra notes 231-84 and accompanying text.
33. See Warner-Jenkinson,117 S. Ct. at 1045.
34. FD & C stands for food, drug, and cosmetic. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v.
Warer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1515 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (per curiam), rev'd,
117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997) (unanimous decision).
35. See id.

36. See id. at 1552 (Nies, J., dissenting).
37. See id. at 1515.
38. See id. at 1552 (Nies, J., dissenting).
39. See id. (Nies, J., dissenting).
40. See id. at 1516.
41. See id. at 1552 (Nies, J., dissenting).
42. See id. (Nies, J., dissenting).
43. See id. (Nies, J., dissenting).
44. The abbreviation "p.s.i.g." stands for "pounds per square inch gauge" and
indicates gauge pressure-the pressure indicated by a pressure gauge-as opposed to
absolute pressure. Absolute pressure is equal to the sum of the gauge pressure plus the
atmospheric pressure (Pa = P, + Pa,). See LEIGHTON E. SISSOM & DONALD R. PiTrs,
ELEMENTS OF TRANSPORT PHENOMENA 70 (1972).
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Also in 1982, Hilton Davis began investigating alternatives to the
salting-out process and, like Warner-Jenkinson, contacted Osmonics
for assistance.46 Osmonics performed tests on Hilton Davis Red Dye
#40 using the same ultrafiltration process it had used for WarnerJenkinson, except that Osmonics hydrolyzed 47 the membrane more
than it did during the Warner-Jenkinson tests.4' The initial tests were
unsuccessful. 49 Osmonics then made changes in the test membrane
and test procedures that resulted in a successful second round of
tests." Several months later, Osmonics also succeeded in using the
process to purify Hilton Davis's Yellow Dye #6.51
In 1983, Hilton Davis applied for a patent in the names of the
inventors of the process. 2 In 1985, United States Patent No.
4,560,746 (" '746 patent") was issued to Hilton Davis. 3 The '746
patent covers an improved purification process involving
ultrafiltration54 that is capable of producing a highly purified dye
more cost-effectively than the salting-out method.5 The patent claim
at issue reads, in pertinent part:
"In a process for the purification of a dye ... the
45. See Warner-Jenkinson, 117 S. Ct. at 1046. The pH, or power (exponent) of
Hydrogen, of a solution is a measure of its acidity or alkalinity. A pH of 7.0 is neutral, a
pH below 7.0 is acidic, and a pH above 7.0 is alkaline. See id. at 1045 n.1. The pH of a
solution is measured on a logarithmic scale. See id. As such, a one-unit decrease in pH
causes a ten-fold increase in acidity and a one-unit increase in pH causes a ten-fold
increase in alkalinity. See id. The presence of a logarithmic scale could potentially create
jury confusion regarding the equivalency between Warner-Jenkinson's process and Hilton
Davis's process because a logarithmic scale is not as commonly used and understood as a
linear scale.
46. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1515.
47. To hydrolyze means to cause to undergo hydrolysis. Hydrolysis is the interaction
"between the ions of water (H' and ON) and those of a salt to form an acid and a base,
changing the pH of the solution when the acid and base are sufficiently different in

strength." THE READER'S DIGEST ASS'N, READER'S DIGEST GREAT ENCYCLOPEDIC
DICTIONARY 657 (10th prtg. 1975) [hereinafter READER'S DIGEST DICTIONARY].
48. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1552 (Nies, J.,
dissenting). Osmonics performed its
test for Hilton Davis just one week after it performed the first test for Warner-Jenkinson.
See id. (Nies, J., dissenting).
49. See id. at 1515.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 1552 (Nies, J., dissenting).
53. See Warner-Jenkinson,117 S. Ct. at 1045.
54. See id. "Ultrafiltration uses osmosis to separate components of a solution by
drawing some of the components, but not others, through a membrane." Hilton Davis, 62
F.3d at 1515. "Thus, the '746 process filters impure dye solution through a membrane at
certain pressures, pHs, and pore diameters. Impurities, but not dye molecules, pass
through the membrane, leaving a high purity dye product." Id.
55. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1515.
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subjecting an aqueous

solution ...to ultrafiltration through a membrane having a

nominal pore diameter of 5-15 Angstroms under a
hydrostatic pressure of approximately 200 to 400 p.s.i.g., at a
pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0, to '56thereby cause
separation of said impurities from said dye.

The phrase "at a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0" was added
during patent prosecution.5 7 The inventors were required to add the

upper pH limit of 9.0 during patent prosecution in order to
distinguish the invention from a previous patent that disclosed an
ultrafiltration process that operated at a pH above 9.0.58 There was
apparently no explanation in the prosecution history of why the
lower pH limit of 6.0 was added; Hilton Davis and Warner-Jenkinson
disagreed on the issue.5 9 In 1989, Hilton Davis learned of WarnerJenkinson's use of ultrafiltration and in 1991 sued Warner-Jenkinson
for patent infringement.6
Hilton Davis conceded that there was no literal infringement and
proceeded at trial to rely solely on the doctrine of equivalents. 61 The
issue of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents was among
those issues sent to the jury, and the jury found that Warner-

Jenkinson had infringed the '746 patent.62 However, the jury also
found that Warner-Jenkinson had not intentionally infringed the '746

patent and therefore awarded only twenty percent of the damages

56. Warner-Jenkinson,117 S. Ct. at 1045 (alteration in original) (quoting claim one of
the '746 patent). Claim one of the '746 patent is a Jepson-type claim. A Jepson claim is a
claim "that begins with a preamble that recites an old device, process or combination,
continues with a transition that states 'wherein the improvement comprises[,'... and
concludes with the body of the claim as the statement of the new elements or
improvements upon the old device, process or combination." 3 CHIsUM, supra note 9,
§ 8.06[1][c], at 8-104. Jepson claims are favored by the Patent and Trademark Office
because they clearly separate what the applicant claims as his invention from what is in
the prior art. See 3 id. The Jepson claim derives its name from Ex parte Jepson, 1917
Dec. Comm'r Pat. 62, in which the Assistant Commissioner of Patents first approved and
encouraged the use of this form of claim. See 3 CHISUM, supra note 9, § 8.06[1][c], at 8104.1.
57. See Warner-Jenkinson,117 S. Ct. at 1045.
58. See id. at 1045-46.

59. See id.at 1046. Warner-Jenkinson contended that the lower limit was added
because the patented process created foaming problems in the plant below a pH of 6.0
and was not shown to work below this pH level. See id. at 1046 n.2. Hilton Davis
indicated that the process was successfully tested at pH levels as low as 2.2 but offered no
explanation as to why the lower pH limit of 6.0 was selected. See id.
60. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1516.
61. See Warner-Jenkinson,117 S. Ct. at 1046.
62. See id.
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Hilton Davis requested. 63 The district court entered a permanent
injunction that prohibited Warner-Jenkinson from using64 the
ultrafiltration process below 500 p.s.i.g. and below a pH of 9.01.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit heard the case en
banc and affirmed the district court by a seven-to-five vote in a
decision that included three separate dissents.65 The majority in the
Federal Circuit held that the doctrine of equivalents survived the
passage of the Patent Act of 195266 ("the 1952 Act") and that the test
under the "doctrine of equivalents rests on the substantiality of the
differences between the claimed and accused products or processes,
assessed according to an objective standard."'67 The court held that
there was substantial evidence in the record to support the jury's
finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.' The
court also held that the determination of whether prosecution history
estoppel would bar application of the doctrine of equivalents
required an investigation of what was surrendered and the reason for
surrender. 9 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit held that the addition of
the phrase "a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0" during patent
prosecution to avoid the disclosure in the prior art of a process
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1512. The majority opinion was per curiam. Judge
Newman wrote a concurring opinion. See id. at 1529-36 (Newman, J., concurring). Judge
Plager dissented and was joined by Chief Judge Archer and Judges Rich and Lourie. See
id. at 1536-45 (Plager, J., dissenting). A second dissent was written by Judge Lourie and
joined by Judges Rich and Plager. See id. at 1545-50 (Lourie, J., dissenting). A third
dissent was written by the late Judge Nies and joined by Chief Judge Archer in part. See
id. at 1550-83 (Nies, J., dissenting). The dissent of Judge Nies was heavily relied upon by
the Supreme Court in support of the Court's holding that the doctrine of equivalents must
be applied to each element of a patent. See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
Interestingly, the Federal Circuit chose to address the doctrine of equivalents issues en
bane while leaving the determination of the validity of the Hilton Davis patent to a threejudge panel. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1515 n.1. For the opinion that declares the
validity of the Hilton Davis patent, see Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson
Co., 64 F.3d 675 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
66. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1-376 (West 1984 & Supp. 1998)); Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1526-27. The Supreme
Court reaffirmed the existence of the doctrine of equivalents in 1950. See Graver Tank &
Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950); infra notes 133-57 and
accompanying text. Warner-Jenkinson argued that because Congress did not codify the
doctrine of equivalents in the rather comprehensive Patent Act of 1952, the doctrine of
equivalents was invalidated legislatively. The Warner-Jenkinson Court rejected this
argument. See Warner-Jenkinson, 117 S. Ct. at 1526-27. The argument is discussed
further infra in notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
67. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1518.
68. See id. at 1528-29.
69. See id. at 1525.
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operating at a pH above 9.0 did not bar Hilton Davis from invoking
the doctrine of equivalents to challenge Warner-Jenkinson's process
operating at a pH of 5.0.70

The Supreme Court unanimously reversed and remanded in a
decision authored by Justice Thomas?' The Court held that the
doctrine of equivalents as established in Graver Tank &
Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.72 survived the passage
of the 1952 Act. 3 The Court stated that the language of the 1952 Act
and the Patent Act of 187074 ("the 1870 Act") contained only minor
differences in the areas of claiming, reissue, and the role of the Patent
and Trademark Office, and that such minor differences were not
grounds for overruling Graver Tank." The Court also rejected
Warner-Jenkinson's argument of implied negation of the doctrine of
70. See id. at 1528. In general, prior art is "anything in tangible form that may
properly be relied on by [the] patent office ... in support of [a] rejection ... of [a] claim
in [a] pending patent application" and "includes any relevant knowledge, acts,
descriptions and patents which pertain to, but predate, [the] invention in question."
BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 828 (abr. 3d ed. 1991).
The Federal Circuit took the opportunity to address many substantive questions
surrounding the doctrine of equivalents. The court held that the intent of the alleged
infringer is not an element of an infringement claim under the doctrine of equivalents, see
Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1519, and that the proper time for evaluating whether an accused
element is a known equivalent to an element in the patent is at the time of the
infringement as opposed to the time the patent was issued, see id. at 1528. The court also
held that the function-way-result test was not the sole test for equivalency, see id. at 1518,
and, as a result, the court held that other evidence in addition to function-way-result
evidence is relevant to the doctrine of equivalents, see id.; infranote 91 and accompanying
text (defining the function-way-result test). The court also determined that evidence of
copying is relevant to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents because evidence of
copying permits a fact-finder to infer that the copyist has made a copy that contains only
insubstantial differences. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1519. The court ruled further that
evidence of "designing around" is relevant to infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents because it permits a fact-finder to infer that the competitor has made
substantial changes in the product at issue in order to avoid infringement. See id. at 1520.
The court also held that evidence of independent development is not directly relevant to
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents but can be introduced to rebut evidence of
copying introduced by the patentee. See id. The court concluded that infringement is a
question of fact to be submitted to the jury in a jury trial and to be decided by a judge in a
bench trial, see id. at 1522, and that evidence of whether a person reasonably skilled in the
art would have known of the interchangeability of accused and claimed elements is
relevant in determining whether one reasonably skilled in the art would have considered
the change insubstantial, see id. at 1519. Any further discussion of these holdings is
beyond the scope of this Note.
71. See Warner-Jenkinson,117 S. Ct. at 1045.
72. 339 U.S. 605 (1950) (5-4 decision).
73. See Warner-Jenkinson,117 S. Ct. at 1047-48.
74. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (current version at 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-376
(West 1984 & Supp. 1998)).
75. See Warner-Jenkinson,117 S. Ct. at 1047-48.
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equivalents through the language of the means-plus-function
claiming provisions in paragraph 6 of § 112 of the 1952 Act
("paragraph 6"), which were not contained in the 1870 Act.7 6 The

Court reasoned that paragraph 6 had been passed by Congress in
response to HalliburtonOil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker'7 to allow

means-plus-function claims. 78 The Court declined to read the specific
inclusion of "equivalents" in paragraph 6 to mean that Congress had
impliedly eliminated the doctrine of equivalents
with respect to all
79
claims.
means-plus-function
for
except
claims
The Court also accepted the notion that the doctrine of
equivalents is to be applied to each individual element of the claim-

the "each-element" test-thereby rejecting the position that an
invention should be examined as a whole."0 In doing so, the Court
acknowledged the concern of the dissenters below that a broadly
applied doctrine of equivalents conflicted with the "definitional and
public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement."" The
Court reasoned that the each-element test would harmonize the

Court's position on the doctrine of equivalents with the Court's
simultaneous assertions that courts cannot expand a patent beyond
the scope of its claims as established by the Patent Office.82 The
Court concluded that the scope of the patent would not be enlarged if
76. See id. at 1048. Paragraph 6 of § 112 reads as follows:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or
step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure,
material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover
the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof.
35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 6 (1994). Means-plus-function claims allow an applicant to
"describe an element of his invention by the result accomplished or the function served,
rather than describing the item or element to be used (e.g., 'a means of connecting Part A
to Part B,' rather than 'a two-penny nail')." Warner-Jenkinson,117 S. Ct. at 1048. For
additional information on means-plus-function claims, see 5 CHISUM, supra note 9,
§ 18.03[5], at 18-59 to -69.
77. 329 U.S. 1 (1946). In Halliburton,the Supreme Court held that certain functional
claims were overbroad and ambiguous. See id. at 8-14.
78. See Warner-Jenkinson,117 S.Ct. at 1048. The Court observed that the statute's
limitation of means-plus-function claims to only those means that are equivalent to the
actual means disclosed in the patent specification serves to limit the broad literal
language of means-plus-function claims. See id.
79. See id. In fact, the Court went on to state that "Congress can legislate the
doctrine of equivalents out of existence any time it chooses." Id.
80. See id. at 1049. Infringement does not require a one-to-one correspondence of
elements. A combination of elements may be used to form an equivalent element. See
Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 949 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc)
(Nies, J., additional views).
81. Warner-Jenkinson,117 S.Ct. at 1049.
82. See id.
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courts limited the doctrine to the substitution of equivalent
elements.m
The Court agreed with Warner-Jenkinson that the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel continued to remain a limitation on the
doctrine of equivalents and provided clarification on the proper
application of the doctrine.' The Court stated that an exploration of
the reason for an amendment during patent prosecution was
necessary in order to decide whether prosecution history estoppel
would preclude a finding of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.8
Prosecution history estoppel bars an action for
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents when an amendment
required during the patent application process was necessary to avoid
the prior art.86 The Court held that the burden of establishing the
reason for an amendment required during patent prosecution belongs
to the patentee and that, once the patentee establishes the reason for
the amendment, the court decides "whether that reason is sufficient
to overcome prosecution history estoppel as a bar to application of
the doctrine of equivalents to the element added by that
amendment."' In order to handle cases like Warner-Jenkinson, in
which no reason is provided in the record for an amendment during
the patent prosecution, the Court created a rebuttable presumption
that the Patent and Trademark Office had a "substantial reason
related to patentability for including the limiting element added by
the amendment."' Since no reason for the addition of the lower pH
limit of 6.0 was provided in the record in this case, the Court
remanded to the Federal Circuit to determine whether adequate
reasons for the amendment were provided and whether an additional
opportunity to establish such reasons should be provided.89
The Court declined to declare the proper test for determining
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 1050-51.
86. See id. at 1049-51. The Court's decision leaves open the question of whether
changes other than those to avoid prior art will trigger the application of prosecution
history estoppel. See infra notes 269-78 and accompanying text. Non-prior-art changes
include amendments to enhance clarity or avoid overbreadth of the patent language and
to establish the utility of the invention. See infra note 236.
The Court made it clear that the correctness of the Patent and Trademark Office's
decision to require a change based on the prior art was reviewable on direct appeal from
the denial of the patent, but was not reviewable in an action based on infringement. See
Warner-Jenkinson,117 S. Ct. at 1051 n.7.
87. Warner-Jenkinson,117 S. Ct. at 1051.
88. Id.
89. See id.
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1947
The Court

discussed the merits of both the "function-way-result" test 91 and the
"substantial differences" test 92 and concluded that the phrasing of the

test does not matter as long as it answers the essential question:
"Does the accused product or process contain elements identical or
equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention?"'93
With this approach in mind, the Court left the formulation of the test

for equivalency up to the Federal Circuit to refine on a case-by-case
basis using its special expertise in the area of patent law.94
90. See id. at 1054.
91. See id The function-way-result test, referred to by the Warner-Jenkinson Court
as the "triple-identity" test, see id., asks whether the accused device "'performs
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result.'"
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (quoting
Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30,42 (1929)).
92. See Warner-Jenkinson, 117 S.Ct. at 1054. The Federal Circuit expressed the
substantial differences test-or, as the Court named it, the "insubstantial differences"
test, see id.-as an analysis of "the substantiality of the differences between the claimed
and accused products or processes, assessed according to an objective standard." Hilton
Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1518 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(per curiam), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997) (unanimous decision). There was some
concern that, if the Supreme Court had not stressed the each-element test, the Federal
Circuit's holding regarding the substantial differences test in Hilton Davis could have
called into question the use of the each-element test, which had been a prominent feature
of the Federal Circuit's caselaw since Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland,Inc., 833 F.2d
931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc). See Farrand & Johnston, supra note 24, at 3; infra note
180. The Pennwalt court held that the each-element test is the proper test for finding
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. See Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 935.
93. Warner-Jenkinson,117 S.Ct. at 1054.
94. See id. However, in dicta, the Court essentially overruled the Federal Circuit's
holding that evidence of copying, designing around, and independent development, when
introduced to rebut evidence of copying, has relevance to infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents. See id. at 1052. The Federal Circuit had held that evidence of copying was
relevant because it permitted an inference of insubstantial differences and that evidence
of designing around was relevant because it permitted an inference of substantial
differences. See id.; supranote 70. The Court observed that this explanation for allowing
evidence of copying and designing around "leaves much to be desired. At a minimum,
one wonders how ever to distinguish between the intentional copyist making minor
changes to lower the risk of legal action, and the incremental innovator designing around
the claims, yet seeking to capture as much as is permissible of the patented advance."
Warner-Jenkinson,117 S.Ct. at 1052.
The Court did hold that evidence of independent development, although not
admissible to rebut evidence of copying, could be probative of the question of whether
one reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of the
accused element and the patented element and therefore would be admissible for that
purpose. See id. The Court also affirmed the Federal Circuit's holding that an alleged
infringer's intent is not an element under the doctrine of equivalents. See id. The Court
concluded that because the doctrine of equivalents was predicated on the "notion of
identity between a patented invention and its equivalent," infringement-be it literal or
based on equivalents-should be treated the same. Id. Because intent plays no role in
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In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Kennedy, Justice
Ginsburg added a cautionary note regarding the newly announced
rebuttable presumption for prosecution history estoppelY Justice
Ginsburg was concerned that a rigid application of the presumption
would unfairly affect patents prosecuted before the presumption
existed because patentees would have had little incentive to insist on
having the reasons for all amendments documented in the patent
prosecution file.96 Justice Ginsburg suggested that with respect to
existing patents, the lower courts should keep in mind the absence of
clear rules on prosecution history estoppel when deciding whether
the patentee had established suitable reasons for making the
amendments. 97
As noted by the Court in Warner-Jenkinson,patent infringement
cases decided by the Supreme Court had developed along two
distinct lines. 98 In one line of cases, the Supreme Court has
consistently stated that the courts have no right to enlarge a patent
claim. A typical case in this line is Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix
Iron Co.99 In Keystone Bridge, the patentee had obtained a patent for
using wide and thin rolled bars with enlarged ends as the lower
chords in truss bridges. 10 The defendant constructed cylindrical bars
determining literal infringement, infringement under the doctrine of equivalents does not
require proof of intent either. See id. The Court also held that the "proper time for
evaluating equivalency-and thus knowledge of interchangability between elements-is
at the time of infringement, not at the time the patent was issued." Id. at 1053. The
Court declined to decide whether the application of the doctrine of equivalents was a
question for the judge or the jury because resolution of that issue was not necessary to
resolve the question presented in the case. See id. Analysis of the Court's decisions on
these issues is beyond the scope of this Note.
95. See Warner-Jenkinson,117 S. Ct. at 1054-55 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
96. See id. at 1055 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
97. See id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). On remand, the Federal Circuit held that,
under the element-by-element approach, there was sufficient evidence in the record to
support the jury's finding that a pH of 5.0 in Warner-Jenkinson's process was equivalent
to a pH of "approximately 6.0" as claimed in Hilton Davis's patent. See Hilton Davis
Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (en bane). The
Federal Circuit also held that "where the prosecution history is silent or unclear the
district court should give a patentee the opportunity to establish the reason, if any, for a
claim change." Id. at 1163. In so holding, the court responded to Justice Ginsburg's
concern that patentees prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Warner-Jenkinson had
little incentive to include express indications as to why amendments were made. See id.
Finally, the Federal Circuit held that if a court determines that a nonpatentability-related
amendment was made during prosecution, the court must determine if the reason for the
amendment is sufficient to overcome estoppel and that whether the "reason is sufficient
depends on the particular facts of the case." Id.
98. See Warner-Jenkinson,117 S.Ct. at 1049.
99. 95 U.S. 274 (1877).
100. See id. at 277-78. The primary function of the lower chords in a truss is to hold
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"flattened at the eye" which also were used for the lower chords in
truss bridges.101 The Court, in finding no infringement, stated that
"courts have no right to enlarge a patent beyond the scope of its
claim as allowed by the Patent Office, or the appellate tribunal to
which contested applications are referred."'" The Court held that a
patentee inan infringement suit is bound by the terms of the patent
and "can claim nothing beyond it."''13 The Court also held that if the
invention turns out to be broader than the claim, the patentee "must
be held to have surrendered the surplus to the public."" ° The Court
reasoned that it was the Patent Office's duty to examine, scrutinize,
and limit the patentee's claim to that which the patentee was entitled,
and that the courts could not be expected to reevaluate the patent in
order to "spell out what [the patentee] might have claimed, but [had]
not claimed."' 5
The Court's aversion to expanding the patent claim continued in
Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Butte & Superior Mining Co. 10 6 In
Minerals Separation, the claim at issue called for the use of oil in a
quantity" 'amounting to a fraction of one per cent. on the ore' 07in
a process to improve the concentration of ores. 08 The accused
infringer used oil in a quantity in excess of one percent on the ore to
do the same thing. 9 In finding no infringement by the accused
process, the Court relied on Keystone Bridge in holding that the

the truss together by keeping the lower parts of the truss from spreading apart. See id. at
275.

101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 276.
Id. at 278.
Id.
Id. at 279.

105. Id. at 278. The Court determined that if the patentee had failed to claim the
whole of his invention, the proper remedy was for the patentee to surrender the patent
and file an application for reissue of a new patent encompassing the whole of the
invention. See id. The reissue process allows a patentee to correct a patent that is or may
be deemed to be defective. See 4 CHISUM,supra note 9, § 15.01, at 15-2. For example, a
patentee may believe that a claim in the original patent is either too narrow to protect the
full scope of his invention or too broad to be valid. See 4 id. at 15-2 to -3. The reissued
patent cannot claim any new subject matter. See 4 id. at 15-3. "The claims of the
reissue[d patent] must be for the 'invention disclosed in the original patent'" and cannot
"recapture subject matter intentionally surrendered to obtain the original patent." 4 id.
Reissues that enlarge the scope of the original patent must be applied for within two years
of the issuance of the original patent. See 4 id See generally 4 id. §§ 15.01-.05 (providing
a more thorough discussion of the reissue process).
106. 250 U.S. 336 (1919).
107. Id. at 341 (quoting the patent at issue). "On the ore" indicates that the
percentage of oil used is calculated in reference to the weight of the ore. See id.

108. See id. at 339.
109. See id.
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courts could not expand a patent beyond the scope of its claims. 10
The Court reasoned that the claim is required by the statute in order
to make the patentee define exactly what his invention is."' The
Court continued by saying that it would be "'unjust to the public, as
well as an evasion of the law, to construe [the claim] in a manner
different from the plain import of its terms.' 1112
While long recognizing that the courts do not have the right to
expand a patent claim beyond the scope granted by the Patent Office,
the Warner-Jenkinson Court simultaneously recognized a separate
line of cases that allows a finding of infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents even when no literal infringement is present. Winans
v. Denmead" 3 generally is recognized as the first Supreme Court
decision to use the doctrine of equivalents to find infringement
outside the literal language of the patent claim." 4 The patentee
Winans had obtained a patent on a new type of railroad car to carry
coal." 5 Prior to the Winans invention, coal-carrying railroad cars
were constructed with rectangular floors."6 The patent claim called

for the upper part of the railroad car to be cylindrical and the lower
part to be in the form of a frustum cone.1' 7
The new
cylindrical/conical design had two major advantages over the
previous design: (1) the cylindrical/conical shape evenly distributed
the weight of the coal over the car walls, resulting in cars requiring
less reinforcement in construction,1 8 thereby reducing the overall
weight of the car 19 and enabling production of a coal car that could
carry over three times its own weight in coal;120 and (2) the coneshaped lower part of the car allowed for complete discharge of the
load when the bottom was removed.'
The defendant had
constructed railroad cars similar to Winans's except that they were
110. See id.
at 347 (citing Keystone Bridge, 95 U.S. at 278).
111. See id.
112. Id. (quoting White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47,52 (1886)).
113. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
114. See 5 CHISUM, supra note 9, § 18.02[1]; Adelman & Francione, supra note 11, at
700 n.121.
115. See Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 330-31.
116. See 5 CISuM, supra note 9, § 18.02[1], at 18-5.

117. See Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 339. A frustrum cone is the part of a cone that
remains after cutting off the upper part of the cone along a plane parallel to the base. See
READER'S DIGEST DICTIONARY, supranote 47, at 538.
118. See Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 339.
119. See id. at 332.
120. See id. at 331. Previous coal cars could not carry a load greater than their own

weight. See id. at 340.
121. See id.at 339.
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octagonal/pyramidal in shape instead of cylindrical/conical."' The
evidence at trial indicated that the defendant's car achieved
substantially the same advantages of the Winans car.' z3 Nevertheless,
the district judge ruled that there was no infringement of the patent
because Winans's claim was limited to the particular geometric form
mentioned in the specification and the defendant's car was not
constructed with that particular geometry. 2 4
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed.'2 The
majority relied on the presumption that once a patentee has
described her invention and claimed it in the best mode
contemplated by the inventor to carry out her invention, the law will
presume that the patentee claimed every variation in which her
invention may be copied, unless the patentee manifests an intention
to disclaim some of these variations. 2 6 The question for the Court

became, "How near to a circle, then, must a car be, in order to
infringe?"'127 The Court answered that the car must be "so near to a
true circle as substantially to embody the patentee's mode of
operation, and thereby attain the same kind of result as was reached
by his invention."'"
Justice Campbell authored a dissent, in which Chief Justice
Taney and Justices Catron and Daniel joined. 29 The dissenters
presumed that the patentee must have had a specific reason for
confining his claim to the conical form and suggested that this
limitation on the claim may have been made to assure patent
validity. 30 They argued that Congress had specifically required the
patentee to point out his invention with specificity and that the
decision of the Court went against this congressional mandate.'
They further stated that "[n]othing, in the administration of this law,
will be more mischievous, more productive of oppressive and costly
litigation, of exorbitant and unjust pretensions and vexatious
demands, more injurious to labor, than a relaxation of these wise and
salutary requisitions of the act of Congress."132
122. See idU at 332.

123. See idr at 340.
124. See id.

125. See id at 344.
126. See UL at 343.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

IL at 343-44.
Id. at 344.
See id. at 344-48 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
See iL at 347 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
See id. (Campbell, J., dissenting).
Id. (Campbell, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court ushered the doctrine of equivalents into
modern patent law in Graver Tank & ManufacturingCo. v. Linde Air
Products Co. 3' In Graver Tank, the patentee had obtained a patent
that claimed a welding flux composed of a combination of alkaline
earth metal silicates and calcium fluoride." 4 The actual welding flux
made by the patentee contained silicates of calcium and
magnesium.135 The accused welding flux was similar to that of the
patentee's except that it substituted manganese, which is not an
alkaline earth metal, for magnesium. 36
The Court in Graver Tank stated that "[i]n determining whether
an accused device or composition infringes a valid patent, resort must
be had in the first instance to the words of the claim. If accused
matter falls clearly within the claim, infringement is made out and
that is the end of it."'1 37 However, the Court held that the lack of
literal infringement did not end the inquiry. 38 It then laid out the
rationale for the doctrine of equivalents. In doing so, the Court
compared a person who "pirates" a patented invention to a person
who "pirates" a copyrighted book or play, observing that both will try
to make minor changes in order to avoid liability.139 The Court
observed that, because outright duplication of an invention seldom
occurs, a prohibition solely on literal infringement would leave the
inventor "at the mercy of verbalism."' Limiting the inventor to the
literal words of his claim would essentially "deprive [the inventor] of
the benefit of his invention."''
The Court predicted that the
disclosure of inventions, one of the primary purposes of the patent
system, would decline because inventors would choose to keep their
inventions to themselves rather than risk the pitfalls of disclosing
them to the public.
The Court noted that the doctrine of
equivalents developed as a means to alleviate this problem, 3 and
stated that the "essence of the doctrine is that one may not practice
133. 339 U.S. 605 (1950); see 5 CHISUM, supra note 9, § 18.02[2], at 18-11.
134. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 610. Welding flux is a substance that is applied to
the surface of the objects to be joined during the welding process. See READER'S DIGEST
DICTIONARY, supra note 47, at 514. Welding flux promotes the fusion of the two objects.
See id.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 610.
See id.
Id. at 607.
See id
See id.

140. Id.
141. Id.
142- See id

143. See id. at 608.
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fraud on a patent."'"
The Court held that the doctrine of equivalents can be invoked
by the patentee against an infringer if the infringer's device
" 'performs substantially the same function in substantially the same
way to obtain the same result.' "145 While noting that the doctrine
can be used for both a primary or pioneer invention as well as a
secondary invention in which old ingredients are combined to bring
about novel and useful results, the Court observed that the scope of
equivalency may vary between the two. 46
The Court then turned to defining what constitutes an
equivalent. The Court stated that when determining whether two
things are equivalent, one must examine "the context of the patent,
the prior art, and the particular circumstances of the case." 47 Factors
to be considered include the purpose of the component of the claim
at issue, the characteristics of the component when combined with
other components, and the intended function of the component.'"
The Court stated that an important consideration is "whether persons
reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the
interchangeability of [a component] not contained in the patent with
one that was.' 1 49 The Court held that the trial court's finding that the
defendant's manganese-containing flux was equivalent to the
patentee's magnesium-containing flux was not clearly erroneous. 50
Justice Black and Justice Douglas dissented. They argued that
the Court's holding was a "sterilization of Acts of Congress and prior
[Supreme Court] decisions" which, in combination, require the
patentee to claim his invention with particularity, resulting in a claim
that outlines the patent grant.' 5' Under this notion, the dissenters
said that anything not specifically claimed by the patentee should be

144. Id.
145. Id. (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)). This
test is commonly known as the function-way-result test. See William E. Eshelman,
Comment, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Post-Pennwalt Developments, 65
TUL. L. REv. 883, 887 (1991); supra note 91.
146. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608. A pioneer or primary invention is an invention
in an area that is devoid of significant prior art. See Hofmann, supra note 7, at 1057. A
secondary invention is an invention that is merely an improvement in a crowded field.
See id.
147. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609.
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 612. The Court went on to comment that it would be "difficult to
conceive of a case more appropriate for application of the doctrine of equivalents." Id.
151. Id. at 613-14 (Black, J., dissenting).
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considered as dedicated to the public."52 They further argued that the
patent statute's reissue process was the sole remedy for patentees in
cases in which literal enforcement imposes a hardship due to the
patentees' failure to claim complete protection for their inventions. 15 3
Echoing the terms used by the majority, the dissenters stated that the
majority's decision set the "stage for more patent 'fraud' and 'piracy'
against business than could be expected" from an adherence to the
"congressionally enacted plan to protect business against judicial
expansion of precise patent claims."M The dissenters were troubled
by the fact that manufacturers could no longer rely on the language
of the patent claims, but instead were forced to guess at how far a
non-expert court would expand a claim based on the testimony of
technical experts.1 55 If the manufacturers calculated incorrectly, they
would be exposed to potentially large damage awards for
infringement. 56 The dissenters concluded that requiring such
clairvoyance would impose a burden on business that was not
compatible with the kind of competitive economy the Court
"professed" to have as a goal. 5 7
Although Winans and Graver Tank represent the birth and
reaffirmation of the doctrine of equivalents and establish the broadbrush function-way-result test, they do not provide much guidance on
how to apply the doctrine. Two other cases are helpful in
illuminating the application of the doctrine of equivalents. One such
case is Burr v. Duryee,5 8 decided just ten years after Winans. Burr
involved two machines that manufactured hats. 9 The Court was
asked by the patentee to find infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. 6 In finding no infringement, the Court commented that
abstract phrases like "substantial identity" and "equivalent" were
often used in such an ambiguous manner that they confused the issue,
led to "absurd conclusions," and were unhelpful in "distinguish[ing]
between things that differ." ' ' The Court stated that in order for a
machine to infringe on a patented machine it must contain
152. See id. at 614 (Black, J., dissenting).
153. See id. at 614-15 (Black, J., dissenting); supra note 105 (discussing the reissue
process).
154. GraverTank, 339 U.S. at 617 (Black, J., dissenting).
155. See id (Black, J., dissenting).
156. See id. (Black, J., dissenting).
157. See id. (Black, J., dissenting).
158. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531 (1863).
159. See id. at 531.
160. See id at 532.

161. Id at 572.
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components "'which perform[] the same [function] or produce[] the
same effect in the same way, or substantially the same way.' "162 The
Court rejected the argument that all combinations of machine
components that produce an equivalent result are equivalent, stating
that such an argument was a "flagrant abuse of the term
'equivalent.' "163 Thus, the Court held that the mere fact that the two
machines perform the same function to reach the same result was not
enough to find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.' 64 The
Burr Court concentrated its analysis on the "way" part of the
function-way-result test by looking at the components within each
machine. 65 The Court then held that there was no infringement
in one machine that did not have
because there were components 66
machine.
other
the
in
equivalents
In Water-Meter Co. v. Desper,167 the Court dealt again with the
doctrine of equivalents, this time in an infringement action involving
two water meter designs. 6 The Court stated that a claim consisting
of a combination of components will not be infringed "if any of the
material parts of the combination are omitted.' 69 However, the
Court went on to say that such a claim is infringed if one of the
components is only formally omitted in that the component is
replaced by an "equivalent performing the same [function] and
producing the same result."' 70

Stating that infringement required

"the presence of every one of the elements specified in the
the Court proceeded to
combination secured by [the patent],"''
conclude that there was no infringement because at least one of the
material components of the patentee's water meter was missing in the
The Court noted in its closing
defendant's water meter.'
requires patentees to identify
law
the
observations that because
162. Id at 573 (quoting GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERiCA 322 (1849)).
163. Id.Similarly, the Court in Hubbell v. United States, 179 U.S. 77 (1900), rejected
the argument that two combinations of components were identical because they obtained
the same result. See id. at 86. Instead, the Court said that the question was "whether the
devices or mechanical means by which the desired result is secured are the same." Id.
For a discussion of Hubbell, see infra notes 204-11 and accompanying text.
164. See Burr,68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 572.

165. See id.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172-

See id.
101 U.S. 332 (1879).
See iL at 333.
IL at 335.
Id.
Id.at 336.
See id. at 336-37.
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precisely what is claimed to be new, the patentee gives materiality to
all the elements of a patent claim. 73 Because the patentee had made
each element material, the Court stated that it could not declare any
single element immaterial in a claim that consisted of a combination
of elements. 7 4 Accordingly, the sole question was whether "any part
omitted by an alleged infringer is supplied by some other device or
instrumentality which is its equivalent.' 75
Thus, before deciding Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court
had produced two seemingly incompatible lines of cases. The
Winans/Graver Tank line of cases recognized the doctrine of
equivalents, which helps foster an effective and fair patent system by
protecting patentees from would-be infringers who make
insubstantial changes to patentees' inventions. 6 At the same time,
the Keystone Bridge/MineralsSeparation line of cases recognized the
fundamental idea that patent claims serve to give fair notice to the
public of exactly what is claimed by the patentees so that the public
can avoid infringing the patents. 77
Instead of expressly overruling either line of cases, the WarnerJenkinson Court chose to adopt the reasoning of Judge Nies's dissent
from the court below in an attempt to harmonize these two lines of
cases. 7 8 Judge Nies's reconciliation is based on the premise that "a
distinction can be drawn ...between substitution of an equivalent for
a component in an invention and enlarging the metes and bounds of
the invention beyond what is claimed.' ' 79 The Court agreed with
Judge Nies's premise and held that "the doctrine of equivalents must
be applied to individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as
a whole."'' 0
173. See id. at 337.
174. See id.; Hubbell v. United States, 179 U.S. 77, 84 (1900) (citing Water-Meter Co.
v. Desper, 101 U.S. 332,337 (1879)).
175. Desper,101 U.S. at 337.
176. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
178. See Warner-Jenkinson,117 S. Ct. at 1049.
179. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1573 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en bane) (Nies, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 117 S.Ct. 1040 (1997) (unanimous decision).
180. Warner-Jenkinson, 117 S.Ct. at 1049. There had been some controversy in the
Federal Circuit as to whether the doctrine of equivalents should be applied to the
invention as a whole or on an element-by-element basis. In Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United
States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983), vacated, 117 S.Ct. 1466 (1997), the Federal Circuit
held that "It]he failure to apply the doctrine of equivalents to the claimed invention as a
whole, and the accompanying demand for 'obvious and exact' equivalents of two elements
the presence of which would have effectively produced literal infringement, was error."
Id. at 1364. In Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland,Inc., 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en
banc), decided just four years later, the Federal Circuit held that the proper application of
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On a common sense level, the each-element approach to the
doctrine of equivalents is logical when compared to the requirements
for literal infringement. Literal infringement requires the patent
owner to show that the accused device contains each element of the
patented device. 181 It follows that infringement under the doctrine of
at least
equivalents should require that the accused device contain
12
the equivalent of each element of the patented device.
Support for the each-element application of the doctrine of
equivalents can also be found in Supreme Court precedent. In Burr
v. Duryee,'1' in comparing the accused machine to the patented
machine, the Court noted that no one could say that the two
machines "contain the same combination of mechanical devices, or
substantially the same, to produce the desired effect. Not one of the
devices, or its equivalent, used in one is to be found in the other
. .. .,4
Additionally, in Water-Meter Co. v. Desper,85 the Court
stated two fundamental principles of patent law: (1) when a claim
involves a combination of elements, there cannot be infringement
when any material part of the combination is missing, and (2) when
any part is missing, but an equivalent part is provided that has the
same "office and produce[s] the same result, the patent is
infringed."'85 These two cases provide strong support for the premise
of the
recognized earlier by the Supreme Court that the application
7
doctrine of equivalents required an each-element approach.Y
Despite the Court's proclamation that the each-element
approach reconciles its two lines of precedent,' 8 a close look at the
Keystone Bridge and Minerals Separation cases reveals no such
the doctrine of equivalents was on an element-by-element basis. See id. at 935. In an
opinion in Pennwalt entitled "additional views," Judge Nies distinguished the holding in
Hughes Aircraft by stating that the legal error in Hughes Aircraftwas the requirement for
"obvious and exact" equivalents. See id. at 953 (Nies, J., additional views). For an
argument that the "as a whole" approach is the better application of the doctrine of
equivalents, see Gary S. Levenson, Note, An Element-by-ElementAnalysis of the Doctrine
of Equivalentsin the Court of Appeals for the FederalCircuit,38 DRAKE L. REV. 389, 404

(1988).
181. See 5 CHISUM, supra note 9, § 18.03[4], at 18-55; Hofmann, supra note 7, at 1038.

182
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

See Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 949 (Nies, J., additional views).
68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531 (1863).
Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
101 U.S. 332 (1879).
Id at 335.
For additional opinions supporting an each-element approach to the doctrine of

equivalents, see Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1574-

75 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Nies, J., dissenting), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997)
(unanimous decision), and Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 949-52 (Nies, J., additional views).
188. See Warner-Jenkinson,117 S. Ct. at 1049.
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reconciliation. In Keystone Bridge, the patented device was for "wide
and thin" bars to be applied on edge for use in truss bridges."8 9 The
accused device differed from the patented device only in that the bars
were round or cylindrical. 90 The Court, in finding no infringement,
held that "the courts have no right to enlarge a patent beyond the
scope of its claim as allowed by the Patent Office."''

Nowhere in the

opinion does the Court indicate that any inquiry was made into
whether round or cylindrical truss bars were equivalent to truss bars
that were wide and thin and applied on edge.
Failure to invoke the doctrine of equivalents in Keystone Bridge
seems especially odd considering that the Winans Court had
recognized the doctrine of equivalents twenty-four years previously
while examining two competing devices with only basic geometric
differences. 19 Under Winans, the question for the Court in Keystone
Bridge would have been whether cylindrical and round truss bars
were so near to wide and thin bars that they would "substantially ...
embody the patentee's mode of operation, and thereby attain the
same kind of result as was reached by his invention."' 93 There is no
indication in the Keystone Bridge opinion that an equivalency
analysis was ever used; in fact, the Keystone Bridge Court did not
even mention Winans. In Keystone Bridge, the Court's resolution
seems to have been based more on the premise that once a patentee
picks a geometric form as the claim of his invention, the patent
covers only that geometric form. 194 This is the exact argument that
the Court in Winans rejected. 5
Similarly, the Court in Minerals Separation did not make an
inquiry under the doctrine of equivalents. In Minerals Separation,
the patented process improved the concentrations of ore by using
certain types of oils in a percentage of less than one percent of the
weight of the ore. 196 The accused process was essentially the same,
except that the amount of oil used exceeded one percent of the

189. See Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274,275-76 (1877).
190. See hiL at 278.
191. Id.
192. See supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
193. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330,344 (1853). The modem formulation
of the Winans test under Warner-Jenkinsonwould be whether cylindrical and round truss
bars were identical or equivalent to wide and thin truss bars applied on end. See WarnerJenkinson, 117 S. Ct. at 1054.
194. See Keystone Bridge, 95 U.S. at 278.
195. See Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 343.
196. See Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Butte & Superior Mining Co., 250 U.S. 336, 339
(1918).
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In finding no infringement by the accused

process, the Court stated that the statute required the claim in order
to make the patentee define exactly what his invention is. 19 8 The

Court continued by saying that it would be "'unjust to the public, as
well as an evasion of the law, to construe [the claim] in a manner

different from the plain import of its terms.' "19
Despite the remarkable similarities in facts between Minerals
Separation and Warner-Jenkinson, the analysis used by the Court in

Minerals Separation is strikingly inconsistent with the Court's
pronouncement in Warner-Jenkinson that the application of the

doctrine of equivalents on an each-element basis reconciles the
Court's past treatment of patent infringement cases. Both the
Minerals Separation and the Warner-Jenkinson patents dealt with

processes--one to remove impurities from ore, the other to remove
impurities from dyes. The accused process in both cases varied only
one element to a value outside of the literal language of the claimless than one percent oil versus greater than one percent oil in

Minerals Separation, and a pH of 5.0 versus a pH of between 6.0 and
9.0 in Warner-Jenkinson. For Minerals Separation to be compatible

with the each-element application of the doctrine of equivalents in
Warner-Jenkinson,the Minerals Separation Court needed to ask the

question whether the use of greater than one percent oil was
equivalent to the use of less than one percent oil. Again, no such
inquiry into the equivalency of the processes was undertaken. Thus,

it is reasonable to conclude that both Keystone Bridge and Minerals
Separationhave effectively been overruled by Warner-Jenkinson.0°
197. See id. at 340-41.
198. See icL at 347.
199. Id. (quoting White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47,52 (1886)).
200. Perhaps a better way of viewing the each-element application of the doctrine of
equivalents is that it provides an apt reconciliation of the competing policies behind the
two lines of Supreme Court cases instead of actually reconciling the cases themselves. As
previously noted, the two conflicting policies involved in the doctrine of equivalents are
the policy of giving fair notice to the public of the scope of the patent, and the policy of
giving complete and fair protection to the patentee's invention. See supranotes 11-14 and
accompanying text. The each-element approach reconciles these two policies by
providing a middle ground between either eliminating the doctrine of equivalents entirely
or adopting the broad "as a whole" approach. The each-element approach provides fairer
notice to the public when compared to the "as a whole" approach in that the public can
read the claims of a patent and know that infringement will occur only if each element of
each claim of the patent, or its equivalent, is present in the accused device. On the other
hand, the each-element approach provides fairer protection to the patentee's invention
when compared to complete elimination of the doctrine of equivalents in that the scope of
the patent under the each-element test is broadened beyond the literal language of the
patent claims. Thus, the Court's decision to apply the doctrine of equivalents on an
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In order to develop a compromise between applying the doctrine
of equivalents and holding a patentee to the literal language of the
claims, courts developed the doctrine of prosecution history
estoppel.20 ' The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel prevents a
patentee in an infringement suit from obtaining a construction of a
claim that would include subject matter surrendered during patent
prosecution before the Patent and Trademark Office. 2 2 When a
court determines that prosecution history estoppel applies, an action
for infringement based on the doctrine of equivalents is barred.0 3
Three Supreme Court cases are illustrative of the Court's
application of the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel. In
Hubbell v. United States,2' the patentee had obtained a patent for a
reloading cartridge. 05 During the prosecution of the patent, the
plaintiff amended the specification once 06 and amended the claims
twice.m The first amendment to the claims was necessary to
overcome the examiner's objections based on prior art.20 The next
amendment was necessary to overcome the examiner's rejection of
the already amended claims as " 'vague, indefinite and
ambiguous.' "209 The Court summarily declined to apply the doctrine
element-by-element basis can also be viewed as an approach that furthers both fair notice
and fair protection simultaneously, thus reconciling the two competing policies. More
generally, both the public and the patentees will benefit from the increased fairness that
the each-element test should bring to the equivalency determination. By replacing an allencompassing equivalency analysis with many small equivalency analyses, the eachelement test tightens the focus of the equivalency determination, thereby reducing its
subjective and arbitrary aspects and increasing the fairness of the result. One facet of this
increased fairness is increased predictability. Increased predictability will benefit both
the public and the patentees because each will be able to predict more accurately whether
a process or device will infringe a patented process or device. More accurate predictions
of infringement will aid the public in its decisions to bring processes or devices to the
market and will aid the patentees in their decisions to bring infringement actions against
competing processes or devices.
201. See Casey, supra note 16, at 369 & n.33. "Prosecution history estoppel" is also
known as "file wrapper estoppel." The Federal Circuit created the phrase "prosecution
history estoppel" as a substitute for the phrase "file wrapper estoppel." See id. at 364 n.9.
The term "file wrapper" literally describes the jacket within which all of the documents
filed in connection with a patent are kept. See 5 CHISUM, supra note 9, § 18.05, at 18-151.
202. See 5 CHISUM, supra note 9, § 18.05, at 18-152 to -153.
203. See 5 id. at 18-153.
204. 179 U.S. 77 (1900).
205. See id. at 84.
206. See id. at 80.
207. See id. at 81-82.
208. See id. at 81. In this instance, the patent examiner rejected the patent applicant's
claim because it either lacked novelty or was obvious in light of the prior art. See 35
U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (1994).
209. Hubbell, 179 U.S. at 82 (quoting the examiner's rejection). Patent law requires
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of equivalents because the Court could not "accept the contention
that these two combinations are identical because they are intended
to obtain the same result. '210 In dicta, the Court stated that a valid
infringement claim should not be defeated by "mere changes of
expression" that were made to satisfy the examiner, when the claim
as made and the claim as allowed have substantially the same
meaning. 211
In Keystone Driller Co. v. Northwest Engineering Corp.,1 2 the
patentee plaintiff's original claim had been rejected by the examiner
due to the prior art 3 In order to distinguish his claim from the prior
art, the plaintiff made an argument that appeared in the printed
record and that eventually led to the examiner's acceptance of a
narrower claim.1 4 In reference to the plaintiff's arguments to the
examiner in favor of patentability, the Court held that it would not
apply estoppel to arguments made by an applicant in an effort to
avoid the prior art cited against his broad claims, but "where sich
broad claims are denied and a narrower [claim] substituted, the
patentee [would be] estopped to read the granted claim as the
equivalent of those which were rejected."2
Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp.2 6 is considered the
leading modern Supreme Court decision on prosecution history
2
estoppel.V17
The patent at issue concerned a switch that could be used
in pinball machines that would close an electrical circuit when hit by
a ball.21 8 During prosecution, the patent applicant amended his claim
language from a "'conductor means carried by the table'" to a
" 'conductor means in said circuit and embedded in the table.' ,219
The patent examiner required this amendment to distinguish the
claim from the prior art.2
that an inventor particularly point out what he claims as his invention. This requirement
is currently contained in the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, which provides "that
the specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." 35
U.S.C. § 112 para. 2 (1994). The patent examiner's objection in this instance was for
failure to state adequately what the applicant claimed as his invention.
210. Hubbell, 179 U.S. at 86.
211. See id. at 80.
212. 294 U.S. 42 (1935).
213. See id. at 47.
214. See id. at 47-48.
215. Id. at 48 (emphasis added).

216. 315 U.S. 126 (1942).
217.
218.
219.
220.

See 5 CHISUM, supranote 9, § 18.02[3], at 18-17.
See Exhibit Supply, 315 U.S. at 128.
Id. at 132 (emphasis added) (quoting the original and amended patent language).
See id. at 133.
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The infringement suit involved six accused devices that varied
from the patented device in the form and placement of the
conductor2 1 Two of the accused devices substituted for the
conductor a nail or pin "driven into the table and surrounded... by a
ring attached to the end of [a] resilient coil spring."2 The Court
construed the term "embedded" to "embrace any conductor means
solidly set or firmly fixed in the table, whether or not it protrudes
above or below the surface. ' ' m The Court held that a nail driven into
the table fell within the claim language of "embedded in the table"
and found infringement despite the fact that the nail protruded above
the table surface.'
The four other accused devices used a conductor that was either
"supported by an insulating plate resting on the table or an insulating
core." After finding no literal infringement because the conductor
was not embedded in the table,2 6 the Court considered the plaintiff's
alternative argument that infringement should be found under the
doctrine of equivalents.? 7 However, the Court found it unnecessary
to reach this issue, holding that the doctrine of equivalents could not
be used to recapture claims surrendered by the patentee during the
amendment process.P The Court stated that the patentee, by
changing the claim from "carried by the table" to "embedded in the
table" in order to avoid prior art, disclaimed the difference between
the two phrases.? 9 The Court reasoned that, once disclaimed, the
difference between the two phrases-conductors that are carried by
the table but not embedded in it-cannot be recaptured by the
"doctrine of equivalents, which at most operates ... to secure to the
inventor the full benefits, not disclaimed, of the claims allowed." 30
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court addressed WarnerJenkinson, a case in which there was no definite reason for the claim
amendment that added a lower limit of 6.0 pH. The Court could
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

See id. at 130.
Id.
Id. at 135.
See id.
Id. at 131.
See id. at 135.
See id.

22& See id. at 136. Interestingly, the accused infringers argued that the doctrine of
equivalents "should be discarded because it did not satisfy the demands of the statute that
the patent shall describe the invention." Id. The Court found it unnecessary to reach the
question of whether the doctrine of equivalents continued to be viable because resort to
the doctrine of equivalents was precluded by prosecution history estoppel. See id.
229. See id.

230. Id. at 137.
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have held that prosecution history estoppel applied to any
amendment made to a claim during the patent prosecution if the
amendment was required by the patent examiner before he would
issue the patent. This was the argument made by Warner-Jenkinson
before the CourtPI and by Judge NiesI 32 in her dissent below. 3 This
position is also supported by the Court's own precedent. In Hubbell,
the Court stated that "it is well settled that the claim as allowed must

be read and interpreted with reference to the rejected claim and to
the prior state of the art, and cannot be so construed as to cover
either what was rejected by the Patent Office or disclosed by prior
devices."' In Exhibit Supply, the Court stated that it had long been
settled that the doctrine of equivalents could not be used to
"recapture claims [that] the patentee [had] surrendered by
amendment." z 5 In neither case did the Court restrict the application
of prosecution history estoppel to those situations in which the
amendment was required to overcome prior art or was related to
patentability. In fact, the Hubbell Court was careful to point out that
prosecution history estoppel would apply to amendments resulting
from claims rejected by the6 Patent Office or amendments necessary
to overcome the prior art13
The Warner-Jenkinson Court, however, chose to apply
231. See Brief for Petitioner at 34-36, Warner-Jenkinson (No. 95-728).
232. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1572-73
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Nies, J., dissenting), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997) (unanimous
decision).
233. Arguably, the Court mischaracterized Warner-Jenkinson's argument. WarnerJenkinson argued that when a patent examiner required a patent applicant to amend his
claim in order to be granted a patent, the patent examiner's reason for requiring the
amendment should be irrelevant. See Brief for Petitioner at 34-36, Warner-Jenkinson
(No. 95-728). The Court stated, however, that Warner-Jenkinson's argument was "that
the reason for an amendment during patent prosecution is irrelevant to any subsequent
estoppel." Warner-Jenkinson, 117 S. Ct. at 1049. This statement could be read to
encompass amendments made by the patent applicant that were not required by the
patent examiner, which is a broader (and less defensible) argument than the one WarnerJenkinson actually made.
234. Hubbell v. United States, 179 U.S. 77,80 (1900) (emphasis added).
235. Exhibit Supply, 315 U.S. at 136.
236. See Hubbell, 179 U.S. at 80. Patent examiners may reject claims for either prior
art or non-prior-art reasons. Reasons for rejecting claims for prior art include
anticipation and the lack of novelty, see 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994), and obviousness, see id.
§ 103. Reasons for non-prior-art rejections include vagueness and indefiniteness,
nonstatutory subject matter, incompleteness, prolixity, old combination, aggregation,
multiplicity, new matter, obvious method, undue breadth, and lack of utility under 35
U.S.C. § 101. See Casey, supra note 16, at 372 n.51. For more detailed information
regarding prior art and non-prior-art rejections, see U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§§ 706.02 (prior art), 706.03 (non-prior art) (5th ed. rev. 2 1996) [hereinafter MPEP].
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prosecution history estoppel in a narrower fashion,237 holding that
certain unspecified reasons for a claim amendment may avoid
prosecution history estoppel. The Court pointed out that in each of
its previous cases, it applied prosecution history estoppel when an
applicant amended a claim "to avoid the prior art, or otherwise to
address a specific concern such as obviousness-that arguably would
have rendered the claimed subject matter unpatentable."'21 It is true
that the patent examiner required the applicant to narrow his claim
in order to overcome the prior art in Hubbell, Keystone Driller, and
Exhibit Supply.139 Thus, the Court's narrower application of
prosecution history estoppel is equally consistent with the Court's
precedent.2 40
One argument for adopting a broader application of prosecution
history estoppel is the patent policy of giving clear notice to the
public of the scope of the patent.241 If a broader rule were adopted,
the scope of the patent could be determined confidently based on the
actual patent itself and the contents of the publicly available patent
application file.242 The Court's adoption of the narrower rule
requires a judicial inquiry into the reason for the claim limitation, an
analysis that is dependent not only upon the completeness of the
patent history but also upon what a judge or jury concludes about the
reason for the claim limitation.243 The argument is that a judicial
inquiry into the reasons for the limitation is unpredictable and that a
" 'reasons' standard utterly undermines the patent policy of clear

237. Under a narrow application of prosecution history estoppel, a court is "willing to
judge for [itself] the specific limitations a particular amendment has on the available
equivalents of [a] claim." Kurt F. James, Comment, Patent Claims and Prosecution
History Estoppel in the Federal Circuit,53 MO. L. REV. 497, 500 (1988). Under a broad
application of prosecution history estoppel, a court is "unwilling to look behind the
finding in the prosecution history that a claim was amended or otherwise limited to
determine if the claim may yet have some range of equivalents." Id.
238. Warner-Jenkinson,117 S. Ct. at 1049 (emphasis added).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 208,214,220. For example, in Exhibit Supply,
the Court stated that, even if the range of equivalents would have encompassed the
accused devices had the original claim been for a "'conductor means embedded in the
table,' "it was a different question "when the applicant, in order to meet objections in the
Patent Office, based on references to the priorart, adopted the phrase as a substitute for
the broader one 'carried by the table.'" Exhibit Supply, 315 U.S. at 136 (emphasis
added).
240. Although the Warner-Jenkinson Court took a narrower approach to prosecution
history estoppel, the extent to which the Court narrowed the doctrine is unclear. See infra
notes 257-78 and accompanying text.
241. See Brief for Petitioner at 36-37, Warner-Jenkinson(No. 95-728).
242. See id. at 36.
243. See id.
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public notice."' 244

Further support for the broader application of prosecution
history estoppel is provided by the idea that patentees have every
incentive to write a claim as broadly as possible.245 Since patentees
try to make their claims as broad as possible, it makes sense to
presume conclusively that patentees do not surrender matters in a
patent claim without a reason.246 The argument is further supported
by considering both that patentees have the scientific expertise to
engage patent examiners in a full exploration of the merits of
whether matters need to be omitted from the claim, and that
patentees can appeal 24 7 any determinations by the patent examiner

that the patentee believes are too restrictive.
Given the patentee's
incentive to draft claims broadly, the patentee's expertise to defend
against an unjustified narrowing of a claim, and the statutory avenue
of appeal, the argument is that, regardless of what the reason for the
amendment to a claim, it is fundamentally fair to presume
conclusively that the reason is sufficient to apply prosecution history
estoppel.
Although the Court acknowledged the arguments in favor of a
broad application of prosecution history estoppel, the Court chose to
give significant weight to past practices of the Patent and Trademark
Office in opting for a narrower application of the doctrine. The
United States in its amicus curiae brief, joined by the Patent and
Trademark Office, pointed out that there were a "variety" of
reasons-other than overcoming the prior art-why the Patent and
Trademark Office requested changes to claim language. 249 If the
Patent and Trademark Office had been requesting changes without
the intent to limit equivalents, the Court felt that it would be unwise
to presume conclusively that any claim amendment supported

244. Id at 37.
245. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519,534 (1966).
246. See id.
247. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 132, 134, 141, & 145 (1994).
248. See Brief for Petitioner at 37, Warner-Jenkinson (No. 95-728).
249. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 22, Warner-Jenkinson (No.
95-728). In its amicus brief, the United States actually pointed out only two reasons other
than prior art: enablement and additional specificity. See id. at 22-23. The United States
stated that the purpose of the enabling requirement was "not to limit the scope of the
patent right, but to ensure that the invention has been fully disclosed so that, upon the
patent's expiration, the public can practice the invention." Id. at 22. The United States
added that changes to claims to add specificity were "'to impart precision, not to
overcome prior art.'" Id. (quoting Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211,

1220 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
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application of the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel. 0
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the arguments in favor of a
broader application of prosecution history estoppel were not
substantial enough to warrant upsetting the basic assumptions of the
Patent and Trademark Office by adopting a "more rigid rule
invoking an estoppel regardless of the reasons for a change."' ' 1
But the conclusion that the reasons for the amendment to the
claim during prosecution were relevant to determining whether
prosecution history estoppel applied did not resolve the case at hand.
On the facts in Warner-Jenkinson, it was unclear why the patent
examiner required the lower pH limit of 6.0.52 In order to resolve
cases like Wamer-Jenkinson in which the reasons for a claim
amendment are unknown, the Court created a rebuttable
presumption; in the absence of an explanation, the "court should
presume that the [Patent and Trademark Office] had a substantial
reason related to patentability for including the limiting element
added by amendment." 3 Therefore, absent a sufficient reason for
the amendment, prosecution history estoppel will bar the application
of the doctrine of equivalents to the element that was amended. 4 If
a reason is offered, the court is then to decide "whether that reason is
sufficient to overcome prosecution history estoppel as a bar to
application of the doctrine of equivalents to the element added by
that amendment." 5 The Court rationalized the new rebuttable
presumption rule by stating that it provided the "proper deference to
the role of claims in defining an invention and providing public
notice, and to the primacy of the [Patent and Trademark Office] in
ensuring that the claims allowed cover only subject matter that is
properly patentable in a proffered application. ' '256
250. See Warner-Jenkinson,117 S. Ct. at 1050 ("[T]here are a variety of other reasons
why the [Patent and Trademark Office] may request a change in claim language.").
251. Id. In a footnote, the Court added that the mere fact that Warner-Jenkinson's
formulation might provide a brighter line rule for determining when to apply estoppel was
not enough justification to adopt such a rule. See id. at 1050 n.6. The Court felt this was
especially true "where, as here, the [Patent and Trademark Office] may have relied upon
a flexible rule of estoppel when deciding whether to ask for a change in the first place."
Id. The Court viewed Warner-Jenkinson's formulation of the rule as a substantial change
that ran the risk of upsetting the "balances the [Patent and Trademark Office] sought to
strike when issuing numerous patents which have not yet expired and which would be
affected by [the Court's] decision." ldM
252. See id- at 1050; supra note 59 (describing the parties' divergent explanations for
the lower pH limit).
253. Warner-Jenkinson,117 S. Ct. at 1051.
254. See id.
255. Id. at 1050.
256. Id. at 1051.
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The rebuttable presumption that all claim amendments during
the patent prosecution process are made for substantial reasons

related to patentability may well be the most significant aspect of the

Supreme Court's decision in Wamer-Jenkinson. 7 The problematic

aspect of the Court's formulation of the rule is that it still leaves open
two questions: (1) what type of amendments are "related to

patentability," and (2) what is a "sufficient reason" to overcome
prosecution history estoppel." s The determination of what is a
sufficient reason to overcome prosecution history estoppel will

ultimately depend on the type of amendments that are classified as
"related to patentability."

One possible solution to what amendments the Court considers
to be "related to patentability"

is that the Court intended

amendments "related to patentability" to be synonymous with
amendments made to avoid the prior art. One commentator has
taken this approach and suggested that the term "patentability," as
used by the Court, would best be read in reference to the titles of the
chapters in the patent statuteP 9

Chapter 10 of the 1952 Act is

entitled "Patentability of Inventions" and contains the prior art
sections, § 102 (novelty) and § 103 (non-obviousness). 26 Chapter 11
is entitled "Application for Patent" and contains the "make and use"
enablement and the clarify or "impart precision" requirements of
§ 112 (specifications). 261 The argument is that amendments required
to overcome objections based on the Chapter 10 prior art
requirements would give rise to prosecution history estoppel whereas
257. See Kenneth R. Adamo, The Waiting at the (Patent) Bar Is Over-The Supreme
Court Decides Hilton Davis, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 431, 435 (1997);
Mueller, supranote 25, at 509.
258. See Adamo, supra note 257, at 447 ("[T]here is some ambiguity in the Court's
language that may prove very troublesome in deciding what type of rejection gives rise to
estoppel."). The Court's own language even suggests that the meaning of "related to
patentability" is debatable when the Court classifies obviousness as a concern that would
"arguably" render the claim unpatentable. See Warner-Jenkinson, 117 S. Ct. at 1049.
Amendments made to a claim to overcome an objection based on obviousness are clearly
necessary to render the claim patentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994). But, by using
"arguably," the Court seems to be implying that obviousness will not always render a
claim unpatentable. If obviousness might not render a claim unpatentable, one has to
wonder what the Court's definition of "related to patentability" really is.
259. See Adamo, supra note 257, at 447-48.
260. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (1994).
261. See id. § 112. Interestingly, the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
Chapter 2100 of the MPEP is entitled
("MPEP") has a different structure.
"Patentability," see MPEP, supra note 236, § 2100-1, and includes not only the novelty
and non-obviousness requirements of §§ 102 and 103, but also, the specification
requirements of § 112, see id. §§ 2121-2186.
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amendments required to overcome objections based on the Chapter
11 non-prior art requirements would not.262 Under this view,
amendments related to patentability and amendments to avoid the
prior art are synonymous and both would refer to amendments
necessary to overcome rejections based on the prior art sections of
Chapter 10 of the 1952 Act.
It is suggested that the Court's decision can best be understood if
amendments "related to patentability" is defined to mean
amendments necessary to meet the requirements of § 112 as well as
amendments to avoid the prior art. Defining amendments related to
patentability to mean amendments necessary to meet the
requirements of § 112 as well as amendments to avoid the prior art is
supported by the fact that the first two paragraphs of § 112 contain
requirements that are not related to prior art, but that are arguably
conditions of patentability.263 Under this reading of the Court's
decision, amendments to avoid the prior art are classified as a subset
of amendments related to patentability.
Additional support for defining amendments "related to
patentability" to include both prior art amendments and § 112
amendments can be found in the language of the Warner-Jenkinson
opinion. At several points in the opinion, the Court's language seems
to indicate that the Court views amendments related to patentability
more broadly than amendments to avoid the prior art, and may even
view prior art amendments and patentability-related amendments as
mutually exclusive. For example, the Court stated that its precedent
applied prosecution history estoppel to amendments made to avoid
the prior art or amendments that addressed concerns that "arguably
would have rendered the claimed subject matter unpatentable." 264 At
another point in the opinion the Court stated that "[w]here the
262. See Adamo, supra note 257, at 447-48; see also Farrand & Johnston, supra note
24, at 9 (suggesting that one possible reading of the Court's decision is that amendments
for purposes other than avoiding prior art do not give rise to estoppel).
263. See Adamo, supra note 257, at 44748. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of § 112 read as
follows:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and
of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth
the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 paras. 1-2.
264. Warner-Jenkinson,117 S. Ct. at 1049.
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reason for the change was not related to avoiding the prior art ... it
does not necessarily preclude infringement by equivalents of that
element." 65 At least three commentators have recognized that the
Court's language can be taken to mean that amendments related to
patentability 6and amendments to avoid the prior art are not
synonymous.2
Defining amendments "related to patentability" to include
amendments necessary to meet the § 112 requirements is also
supported by the fact that, although the § 112 requirements do not
determine whether the underlying invention is patentable, a patent
application can still be rejected for failure to meet the § 112
requirements.267
Thus, amendments necessary to meet the
requirements of § 112 are "related to patentability" in that the Patent
and Trademark Office will not issue a patent when the patent
applicant has failed to comply with the § 112 requirements. 6
Even accepting that amendments "related to patentability"
includes prior art amendments as well as § 112 amendments, the
Court's decision still leaves open the question of what type of
amendments will trigger the application of prosecution history
estoppel. Absent evidence to the contrary, the presumption is that
the Patent and Trademark Office had a "substantial reason related to
patentability" for requiring the amendment, thereby triggering the
application of estoppel and precluding a finding of infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents. 6 9 Therefore, a "sufficient reason"
to overcome estoppel is a showing that the amendment was made for
reasons which are not substantially related to patentability. 270 It is
clear from the opinion that amendments to a claim to overcome prior
art will trigger prosecution history estoppel.2 71 Thus, amendments
necessary to avoid the prior art must be included in the category of
265. Id. at 1050-51 (emphasis added).
266. See Adamo, supra note 257, at 447-48; Farrand & Johnston, supra note 24, at 9.
267. See MPEP, supra note 236, §§ 706.03(c)-(d), 2161-2186.
268. See id. The structure of the MPEP also supports this conclusion in that the MPEP
discusses both prior-art and non-prior-art objections in a chapter entitled "Patentability."
See supranote 261.
269. See Warner-Jenkinson,117 S. Ct. at 1051.
270. Warner-Jenkinsonis a case in which no reason for the claim amendment appeared
in the prosecution history. It is suggested that in cases in which the reasons for an
amendment appear either in the prosecution history or are offered at trial, a court should
evaluate those reasons in order to determine if any of the reasons were substantially
related to patentability. If any of the reasons were substantially related to patentability,
prosecution history estoppel will apply and bar the application of the doctrine of
equivalents with respect to that amendment.
271. See id. at 1050-51.

1970

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

amendments that are for reasons substantially related to
patentability.
The effect of amendments for reasons other than avoiding the
prior art is less clear.
Accepting that the Court intended
amendments "related to patentability" to include amendments
necessary to meet the requirements of § 112, it is suggested that the
Court, in using the phrase "substantially related to patentability,"
created a hierarchy among those amendments necessary to meet the
requirements of § 112. As such, only those § 112 requirements that
are the most integrally related to patentability will trigger
prosecution history estoppel. 72 Accordingly, amendments required
to meet the specification requirements of § 112 that are substantially
related to patentability would trigger prosecution history estoppel.
Support for a rule that amendments made to meet some § 112
requirements should trigger estoppel while other § 112 changes
should not can be found in the precedents of the Supreme Court and
the Federal Circuit. In Hubbell v. United States,273 the Court, in dicta,
indicated that changes made to a claim that consisted of "mere
changes of expression, having substantially the same meaning"
should not bar an infringement claim 74 Thus, the Hubbell Court
indicated that a clarifying amendment would not give rise to
prosecution history estoppel. In Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations,
Inc., 5 the Federal Circuit stated that, when a claim was amended for
a reason other than avoiding the prior art, the specific change and the
reason for the change must be examined in order to determine
whether prosecution history estoppel applied. 76 The Federal Circuit
then went on to hold that "whether [an] amendment or [an]
argument made in response to a rejection under § 112 produces an
estoppel ...is dependent on the particular facts. 2 77 From these
decisions it can be inferred that some amendments required to meet
272. See Casey, supra note 16, at 392-93.
273. 179 U.S. 77 (1900).
274. d at 80.
275. 66 F.3d 1211 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
276. See id. at 1219.
277. Id. at 1219-20. The Federal Circuit has also invalidated patents for failure to
comply with the § 112 enablement requirements. See, e.g., Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp.,
724 F.2d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1983). If a patent can be invalidated for failure to meet the
§ 112 enablement requirements, it seems equally fair to apply prosecution history
estoppel to changes required to meet the enablement requirements. See Ted Apple,
Enablement Estoppel: Should Prosecution History Estoppel Arise When Claims Are
Amended to Overcome Enablement Rejections?, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. LJ.107, 134-35 (1997).
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the requirements of § 112 should give rise to estoppel while other
amendments required to meet the requirements of § 112 should not
give rise to estoppel. The determination of which § 112 amendments
278
trigger estoppel should depend on the particular facts of the case.
Regardless of how the meaning of "patentability" is eventually
resolved by the Court, the new rule regarding prosecution history
estoppel will change the practice of patent law. First, claim
amendments without explanation must be avoided 79 Under the new
rebuttable presumption, any amendment without explanation is
presumed to be for patentability reasons and will bar the application
of the doctrine of equivalents to claim language removed by such
amendments. 280 Patent prosecutors will need to take the utmost care
in ensuring that the prosecution history accurately reflects the
reasons for the amendments and must be extremely careful not to be
overly broad in making arguments to overcome rejections based on
the prior art.21
Second, if the patent applicant believes that the examiner is
misreading the prior art and thereby requiring unnecessarily narrow
claims, Warner-Jenkinson gives the patent applicant increased
incentive to appeal rather than acquiesce by amending the claim.'
In deciding whether to appeal, a patent applicant must balance any
potential reduction in the value of the patent caused by the narrower
claim against any possible reduction in the patent term that may
The Court's
result from appealing the examiner's decision.M
decision in Wamer-Jenkinson regarding prosecution history estoppel
changes the balancing point in the decision to appeal by increasing
the chances that the subject matter given up by the narrowing of a
claim during patent prosecution will be permanently lost.'
The Supreme Court's decision in Warner-Jenkinsonclarified that
278. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (en banc); Pall,66 F.3d at 1219-20.
279. See Daniel W. McDonald et al., Hilton Davis: The Doctrine of Equivalents
Survives-Now What?, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 309, 325 (1997); Mueller,
supra note 25, at 509.
280. See supra text accompanying note 88.
281. See Adamo, supra note 257, at 447-48; Mueller, supranote 25, at 509.
282. See Adamo, supra note 257, at 447; Mueller, supra note 25, at 510. Patent
applicants may appeal determinations of the patent examiner pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
§§ 134,141, & 145.
283. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(3); Mueller, supranote 25, at 510.
284. See Mueller, supra note 25, at 510. For additional discussion of the impact of
Warner-Jenkinson on the practice of patent law, see Adamo, supra note 257, at 444-50,
Farrand & Johnston, supra note 24, at 9-10, McDonald et al., supra note 279, at 322-29,
and Mueller, supra note 25, at 502-14.
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the proper application of the doctrine of equivalents is on an
element-by-element basis. The each-element approach is consistent
with the Court's previous cases involving the doctrine of
equivalents.m Although the Court stated that the each-element rule
reconciled two lines of Supreme Court precedent, in reality the eachelement rule implicitly overruled the Keystone Bridge/Minerals
Separationline of cases. 6
The Court also created a rebuttable presumption that, when the
reasons for a claim amendment are unknown, the amendment to a
patent claim during the patent prosecution process is for reasons
substantially related to patentability, thus invoking prosecution
history estoppel as a bar to infringement based on the doctrine of
equivalents.W The Court's opinion leaves unanswered the questions
of what is an amendment related to patentability and what is a
sufficient reason to overcome the presumption.'
Based on the
caselaw, the most logical answers to those questions are that
amendments "related to patentability" should be read to mean
amendments made to avoid the prior art as well as amendments
made to meet the requirements of § 112 of the patent statute, and the
determination of what is a sufficient reason to overcome estoppel
should be determined on the particular facts of the case.2 9
Regardless of how these questions are resolved, WarnerJenkinson will affect the practice of patent law in at least two ways.
First, patent prosecutors will need to ensure that patent prosecution
history adequately documents amendments made to the claims to
ensure that the new rebuttable presumption does not bar use of the
doctrine of equivalents in potential infringement actions.290 Second,
patent prosecutors have additional
incentive to
appeal
determinations by the patent examiner that an amendment is
necessary to overcome the prior art.291 Failure to pursue the appeal
will undoubtedly mean foreclosure of the use of the doctrine of
equivalents to protect the scope of the patent that may have been
needlessly surrendered during the patent prosecution.
CHARLES ROBERT LEWIS

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

See supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 188-200 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 88, 253-56 and accompanying text.
See supranote 258 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 259-78 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 279-81 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 282-84 and accompanying text.

